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ABSTRACT 
Content-specificity hypothesis suggests that people with mood disorders tend to 
attend to stimuli that are congruent with their emotional problems. In order to 
investigate such an emotion-congruent attentional bias, a variety of experimental 
paradigms has been applied to individuals with depression or anxiety. Nevertheless, 
despite researchers' endeavors, empirical results obtained are inconsistent and 
contradicting. In the present study, a modified negative priming paradigm was 
introduced to examine this content-specific attentional bias in individuals with 
depression and/or anxiety. According to Milliken and colleagues' (1998) temporal 
discrimination hypothesis, negative priming effect is produced from an intermediate 
match of the cognitive representation of the probe target with that of an unattended 
prime of related identity. Meanwhile, such an effect can be reduced or eliminated by 
attending to the prime stimulus. The aim of the present study was thus to demonstrate 
emotion-congruent attentional bias in individuals with different emotional problems 
via showing reduced negative priming effect of primes of the corresponding 
emotional valences. A total of 134 participants (52 males, 82 females) were recruited 
in the present study and separated into four groups (depression, anxiety, comorbid 
depression/anxiety, and normal control) according to their scores on two scales, Beck 
Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) and Beck Anxiety 
Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988). Participants completed the 
negative priming task on sad- and threat-related word stimuli. Results from repeated 
measures analyses revealed reduced negative priming effect of sad words in the 
depression and comorbid groups as expected, but not in the anxiety and normal 
control groups, indicating that attentional bias occurred specifically in participants 
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with depression. However, positive priming effect of threat-related words was 
generally found in all participants. Implication of the findings and the interaction 
between emotional valence of stimuli and psychopathologies are discussed. 
iv 
摘 要 
內容獨有性假設(Content-specificity Hypothesis )指出，患有情緒問題之人士 
傾向注意與自身情緒問題有關之事物。然而，過去以患有抑鬱或焦慮情緒問題 
人士作爲對象之硏究，都未能一致得出這種情緒一致注意力傾向（Emotion-
congruent Attentional Bias)的硏究結果°而根據米利肯等學者（MiUikeii, 
Joordens, Merikle, and Seiffert, 1998)之時性區分假設（Temporal Discrimination 




Priming Paradigm)——以作測試。是次硏究共邀請了 134位實驗參與者（52 
男、82女）進行測試°根據貝克抑鬱量表（二）（ Beck Depression Inventory-II, 
BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996)及貝克焦慮量表（Beck Anxiety Inventory, 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
Models of Information Processing 
In recent decades, clinical psychologists are expressing increased interest in 
using information processing models to explain the etiology, development and 
maintenance of psychopathologies. In order to understand the pattern of information 
processing, a number of models has been hypothesized and tested. These models aim 
to re-construct the series of steps in which information is processed, namely, for 
example, attention, encoding, comprehension, interpretation, judgment and retrieval. 
Different from the classical cognitive model of depression developed by Beck 
(1976)，which focuses on the structure of the information processing system, more 
attention is now placed on the actual processes contributing to the formation and 
maintenance of these maladaptive cognitive structures. Nevertheless, as one may 
notice, the cognitive structure and the actual pattern of information processing must 
be closely related. They feedback on each other, maintain and being maintained, 
consolidate and being consolidated, modify and being modified. Hence, even though 
the focus has now shifted to the pattern of information processing, basic structure of 
our cognition continues to play an essential role in our understanding of the 
information processing system as a whole. Indeed, two similar models popularly 
examined and referred to when psychologists investigate information processing in 
clinical patients, were constructed for the purpose of modeling the structure in our 
cognitive system. These are Beck's Schema Model (Beck, 1976; Beck & Clark, 1988; 
Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1986) and Bower's Network Model (Bower, 1981; 
Bower & Cohen, 1982). Although their models differ substantially in assumed basic 
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components of the cognitive system, Beck and Bower have essentially the same 
hypotheses for the information processing patterns in depression and anxiety. They 
suggested that depression and anxiety, despite two distinct emotional problems, exert 
similar mode of influence on one's information processing. 
Beck 's Schema Model 
Beck and colleagues (Beck, 1976; Beck & Clark, 1988; Beck et al., 1986), 
drawn on Bartlett's (1932) construct of schemata, proposed a model of cognitive 
system in terms of "cognitive schemas". According to Beck, cognitive schemas 
constitute the basic structure of our cognitive system. They are the basic assumptions 
and beliefs about one self, the world, and the future which people acquired early in 
their development when they tried to understand and conceptualize the external 
environment. They influence our internal memory system, our external selection of 
incoming information, and our perception of these stimuli. Beck argued that, these 
cognitive schemas are normally adaptive. They help the individuals to make sense of 
their environment. However, two hypothesized classes of schema, the depressogenic 
schema and the danger schema, are maladaptive in essence because, although they 
are formulated under consistent experiences of life adversities, they continue to 
operate when the negative environment no longer exist. They distort information 
processing and mediate the formation of emotional pathology. 
According to Beck, depressogenic schema develops as a result of early 
experiences of loss-related, or failure-related situations. The person incorporates the 
negative cognitions as a prototypical representation of such situations, with 
accompaniment of a dysphoric mood state. When he or she subsequently encounters 
similar situations or is induced with sadness emotion, this depressogenic schema will 
be activated. The danger schema also develops in early childhood, but being the 
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result of experiences of risk and hazard. When the person encounters threatening or 
dangerous situations, or when under induced anxious state, the prototypical 
representation of threat, danger, and anxiety in the danger schema will be activated. 
Once the schemas are activated, individuals with depressogenic schema will 
selectively process information related to sadness, loss and failure; while, people 
with danger schema will bias for threatening information. This is the so-called 
content-specificity hypothesis. 
Bower ’s Network Model 
In Bower's network model, a human memory system is introduced to explain 
affective vulnerability in individuals with emotional disorders. Bower proposed that 
the human memory is just like a network of nodes in which different kinds of 
information are stored. Each distinct emotional state is represented in separate node 
within the network, and a specific emotion node will be activated whenever the 
corresponding emotional state is experienced above threshold (Bower, 1981; Bower 
& Cohen, 1982). The nodes are initially weakly connected with each other. Over 
time, nodes that consistently activated simultaneously due to exposure to certain 
environmental situations, that is, nodes that have emotionally congruent contents 
(e.g., the triplets of nodes on emotion, cognition and behavior), will develop close 
connections. As a result, a network of nodes with same trait of emotional contents 
will be developed, which will, when the emotional state is experienced, have 
activation automatically spread throughout the network, and result in increased 
accessibility of the corresponding nodes. 
Similar to Beck, Bower suggested that this kind of mood-congruent 
processing effect is general in every individual. However, pronounced activation of a 
particular mood state will strengthen connections with the corresponding emotion 
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nodes, and serve to elicit an automatic emotion-congruent processing bias. As a 
result, the accessibility of the particular emotion and other emotion-congruent nodes 
in the network will be increased, as in the case of depression and anxiety. 
Although Beck's and Bower's model of emotional vulnerability differ in 
terms of assumed building elements (schemas versus memory nodes), they both 
suggested that: 1) the cognitive structure, whichever it is schematic or network-like, 
is applicable to all human beings. Schemas or nodes become maladaptive only when 
they are over-stimulated or established such that the cognitive system loses the 
flexibility to cope with demands of the external environment, and finally results in 
distorted processing of information. 2) Once became maladaptive, the cognitive 
schemas or nodes lead to cognitive bias favoring processing of emotionally 
congruent information. Thus, in both anxiety and depression, we should be able to 
observe an emotion-consistent bias across encoding and retrieval processes. Such 
biases should be essentially automatic, occur with neither volition nor conscious 
mediation, and can be triggered by anxious or depressed mood state of the possessor. 
Empirical Evidences For and Against Attentional Bias 
From time to time, researchers endeavor to test and verify these information 
processing models and their implications by the use of a variety of experimental 
paradigm (e.g., the Stroop task, dot probe task, recalling task, etc.) in different 
clinical or subclinical groups. Among various cognitive processes, attention is one of 
the hottest areas of investigation. Its importance rests on its function as a filter for 
incoming information and as the basis for study of other cognitive processes, and 
thus, is often considered as the core process among all. 
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A number of researchers has tried to test the attention content-specificity 
hypothesis in depression and anxiety. It is expected to see attentional bias favoring 
emotion-congruent stimuli in depressed and anxious individuals. However, to their 
vexation, the picture is not so clear. Massive experimental replications or 
modifications only result in a large but ambiguous set of empirical evidences. As a 
consequence, some researchers tried to stand out to review the findings so as to build 
up a clearer picture for the field of study. Unfortunately, conclusions drawn in the 
literature reviews are also inconsistent. Here, we present two important works of 
literature review. 
Review by Williams and Colleagues 
Williams, Watts, MacLeod, and Mathew (1988，1997) performed several 
reviews on the area of study. When concluding, they argued for distinct cognitive 
processing mechanisms for depression and anxiety. They suggested that anxious 
individuals are characterized by an automatic attentional (encoding) bias favoring 
threat or danger-related information. This selective attention is particularly 
pronounced in those threat-related stimuli closest to the anxious individual's 
principal domains of personal concern (i.e., of greatest personal relevance) (e.g., 
Mathews & MacLeod，1985; Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1989). It can be elicited 
by elevation of state anxiety, though this happens only in high-trait anxious 
individuals who have high vulnerability to emotional problems. Once activated, the 
process operates automatically without support from volition, proceeds without 
conscious mediation or awareness, and persists even under individual's active 
endeavor to alter (e.g., MacLeod & Rutherford, 1998). 
Contrast to anxiety, pattern of information processing indicated from 
previous experimental research seems to be different in depression. There has been 
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little convincing evidence indicating an attentional bias in depressed individuals. 
Hence, it seems obvious to Williams and his colleagues (1988, 1997) that, the 
phenomenon of selective attention exists only in anxiety, but not in depression. 
Anxiety is associated with attentional bias favoring threat-related stimuli. 
Review by Clark and Colleagues 
Contrast to Williams's review, Clark, Beck, and Alford (1999) claimed that, 
attentional bias does, indeed, appear in individuals suffering from depression. 
According to Clark and colleagues, although the findings do not always replicate 
completely across studies, the overall picture does demonstrate a support for 
selective attentional encoding of negative materials in depression. While there is 
"evidence of attentional bias or vigilance for negative emotion-congruent 
information in depression, ...this attentional bias in depression is not identical in 
form (and certainly not in content) to the bias we see in anxiety." (Clark et al., 1999, 
p. 187). They proposed that the attentional bias of the two disorders may occur in 
distinct aspects of attentional processing. Consistent with Bradley, Mogg, and Lee's 
(1997) argument, they suggested that anxiety may occur in an earlier, preconscious 
stage of attentional processing, which deals with initial orientation towards stimuli. 
Whereas bias in depression influences later stage of information processing, 
involving the processes of attention maintenance. Hence, attentional bias in 
depression is regarded as relatively more elaborative and conscious, while that in 
anxiety is primarily associated with automatic, preconscious shift to threat-related 
stimuli. 
When concluding, Clark et al. (1999) suggested a twofold effect of 
depression on attentional processing which may help explaining some null findings 
in depressed individuals. Firstly, they suggested that depression may result in 
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evenhanded attention to both positive and negative information. It is argued that 
there may be an imbalanced encoding tendency favoring positive information in 
normal people. In depressed people, however, such a "normal" encoding asymmetry 
for positive stimuli is upset by the individuals' increased attention towards also 
negative materials. As a result, whether a researcher can detect the attentional bias or 
not is largely dependent on the nature of the experiment and type of response 
required. Such an encoding difference between people with and without depression 
may be apparent only when the task requires selection among stimuli and thus, 
produces a critical competition for processing resources. Meanwhile, attentional bias 
in depression can simply be viewed as heightened vigilance for negative self-referent 
materials in the individuals. In this sense, whether processing differences can be 
found will be dependent on the level of depression severity and type of stimulus used 
in the experiment (Clark et al., 1999). 
Despite the certain agreements between Williams's and Clark's conclusions 
on characteristics of information processing in depression (e.g., they both claimed 
that biased information processing in depressed individuals is involved in a later, 
more elaborative stage), these two groups of scholars have essentially different 
stands for attentional bias in depression. Also, in spite of the analyses made in these 
masterpieces, there continues to emerge empirical evidences supporting and against 
depressogenic attentional bias. Moreover, some studies even showed no attentional 
bias in both depressed and anxious individuals. In view of the complexity of these 
contradicting empirical findings, it seems necessary to investigate the origin of 
controversies from a theoretic perspective of attentional bias. That is, it is essential to 
examine firstly the basic attentional and selective attentional processes, and then to 
,�.:.�...‘�.�Attentional Bi s in Depression and Anxiety 8 
consider the validity of the various experimental paradigms in measuring attentional 
bias in people with depression or anxiety. 
Model of Attention and Selective Attention 
The information processing approach discussed so far is an influential 
perspective that draws an analogy between human cognition and the computerized 
information processing. It emphasizes stage-like processing and storage of 
information during processing (Galotti, 1999). A common understanding of the 
information processing system recognizes the importance of attention before 
elaboration. That is, any incoming stimulus must be attended before entering the 
deeper processing stages of recognition, comprehension, and then to interpretation 
and judgmental processes. Hence, the attention stage is commonly regarded as the 
very first stage of information processing when researchers examine information 
processing bias in patients. Indeed, a number of experimental paradigms were 
designed or applied to tap attentional bias based on such understanding of 
information processing (e.g., dot probe task). However, this way of conceptualization 
missed one very important point: if there is any attentional bias, that is, a selective 
attention towards or away from stimuli containing certain characteristics, there must 
exist some recognition processes which precede the selective attentional process. It is 
because we must have already processed parts of the incoming stimuli before we can 
"choose" specific kind(s) of information to further process. This, thus, leads to a 
quest for the meaning of "attention". 
Meaning of Attention 
What it means by "attention"? According to The University of Alberta's 
Cognitive Science Dictionary (1997), attention is "an internal cognitive process by 
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which one actively selects environment information (i.e., sensation) or actively 
processed information from internal sources (i.e., visceral cues or other thought 
processes)." It means, attention should be an active and "mindful" processing of 
information, whatever the information comes from the external environment, or by 
our internal generation. In 1890, William James also explained attention as follow: 
"Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the 
mind in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several 
simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought...It implies 
withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others, 
and is a condition which has a real opposite in the confused, dazed, 
scatterbrained state." (1890, p. 403). 
Therefore, attention involves the process of withdrawing cognitive resources 
from processing of several external sources of stimuli or internal operations, and then 
to focus them to particular external or internal stimuli for the purpose of obtaining a 
clear, vivid understanding of the information. Hence, it is usually difficult for us to 
attend to several stimuli simultaneously. Also, according to Galotti (1999), attention 
is the "cognitive resources, mental effort, or concentration devoted to a cognitive 
process" (p. 585). Generally speaking, attention can be regarded as "an ability to 
focus and maintain interest in a given task or idea, including managing distractions" 
(The University of Alberta's Cognitive Science Dictionary, 1997). 
Pre-attentive versus Attentive Stage 
So, how can we relate the previously hypothesized "pre-attentive" stage with 
attention? Contrast to attentive (attention) stage, the pre-attentive stage is a stage in 
which information processing is absolutely unconscious, without one's volition or 
awareness. Using William James' words, it is a "confused, dazed, scatterbrained 
state". 
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In the same line as Deutsch and Deutsch's (1963) late-selection theory, we 
suggest that all information is routinely processed for at least some degree before 
those most relevant to our survival or interest is then attended for a "later", deeper 
processing. Most of these pre-attentive processes are probably below threshold of 
awareness, and those information "judged" to be more important is processed more 
fully. Pashler (1998) described this processing, with reference to the late-selection 
theory, as "Recognition of familiar objects proceeds unselectively and without any 
capacity limitations." (p. 17). We agree to Deutsch and Deutsch's (1963) theory by 
arguing that, actually, we do have already recognized the stimuli before actively 
directing our attention towards them. However, contrast to the late-selection theory, 
we propose that this unconscious recognition of stimuli does not necessarily restrict 
solely to those familiar objects or stimuli. Whether a stimulus will be processed 
further or not depends also on its degree of importance. 
Any incoming information or message can be viewed in terms of 
"importance". This is determined by several factors such as the context, the 
observer's level of alertness, and more importantly, the personal significance of the 
information content. Incoming stimuli will activate their corresponding information 
nodes or cognitive schemas. But, according to Beck's and Bower's model discussed 
earlier, only stimuli with greater personal relevance will most likely attract our 
attention. During the unconscious recognition of this personal relevant information, 
the corresponding schemas (as named by Beck) or information nodes (as named by 
Bower) produce feedbacks to initiate the process for directing attention to these 
important incoming stimuli. This thus results in lowered threshold for conscious 
detection and elaborated processing of this piece of information. Attended 
information will be retained and further processed in our cognitive system; while, 
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unattended materials will also remain in the system for at least a short period of time. 
Hence, even unattended stimuli may still have the possibility of being undergoing 
further, more elaborated processing. Nevertheless, this occurs only when the initial 
processing of these less important stimuli has not yet faded away. 
Therefore, we suggest that there should be a pre-attentive processing of 
information preceding the active attention process commonly recognized by most 
researchers. Information processing in this pre-attentive stage is automatic, rapid and 
unconscious, involving no volition or awareness. Incoming information first enters 
this stage of processing during which stimuli are encoded and recognized to a certain 
extent. Only after that will information with greater personal relevance, interest or 
survival value be attended, further processed, and elaborated. In contrast, the 
attentive stage is a more conscious stage, usually involving active directing of 
cognitive resources towards information processing. 
Attentional Bias in Emotional Disorders: from External to Internal Attention 
Clinical psychologists always have the following observation or experience: 
their patients, regardless of types of emotional psychopathology, are highly sensitive 
to the kinds of stimuli that are closely related to their emotional problems. These 
stimuli can be some internal physical signals such as increased heart rate or 
constricted breathing, or some external incoming information such as critical words, 
signs of rejection, threat, or danger. But, they are not always aware of their 
heightened vigilance to these stimuli. "Sensitive to something" means that one is 
always prepared to attend to it, process it, and then to respond. Stated by Beck in 
1963: 
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“While some degree of inaccuracy and inconsistency would be 
expected in the cognitions of any individual, the distinguishing 
characteristic of the depressed patients was that they showed a 
systematic error (original italics); viz., a bias against themselves." 
(1963, pp. 328). 
People with emotional problems have the tendency to select emotion-congruent 
external incoming information to process across different situations. Another 
characteristic of these individuals is that they have reduced processing of external 
incoming stimuli. After a glance of the external stimulus, they shift their attention 
quickly from external to internal stimulus. It is a common clinical observation that 
patients pick up just one piece of incoming information but continue to attend to the 
thought developed from it, and even generate more emotion-congruent 
interpretations from this little piece of information, based upon previous experiences 
and the schemas thus developed. So, these patients' understanding of the world 
depends heavily on their previous experiences and hence, making their reaction to 
environment "out-dated" and inappropriate. 
Issues of Methodology 
Experimental Paradigms 
As noted above, researchers wish to enrich their understanding of cognitive 
processing, especially attentional bias, in individuals with anxiety and/or depression 
through testing Beck's Schema Model and Bower's Network Model. Unfortunately, 
cumulative research findings are inconsistent and cannot give a clear conclusion to 
the topic in question. Investigation of the possible cause gives rise to a basis, but 
essentially important question: What, actually, are these studies measuring? 
Specifically, it is possible for each of the experimental paradigms to be tapping 
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different elements in our information processing system. Sometimes, we just cannot 
be certain whether we have measured the right processes, or we may not realize that 
what we are measuring is different from what we intended to measure. In order to 
solve the paradox of inconsistent findings among the literatures, it is necessary to 
examine each of the commonly applied experimental paradigms: the naturalistic 
visual scanning task, dot probe task, and the emotional Stroop color-naming task. 
Naturalistic Visual Scanning Task 
Emerged as a product of advanced technology, the naturalistic visual 
scanning paradigm is regarded as a direct and simple test for selective visual 
attention. In a typical experiment, participants will be presented with pairs of pictures 
(or multiple complex visual stimuli) for a certain period of duration (e.g., 3000ms). 
They are instructed to simply view the images and no response is required. Before 
the starting of the experiment, the participants will be fitted with a head-mounted eye 
tracking system which is used to track the distinctive reference targets the 
participants place on the various pictorial stimuli and to determine the point-of-gaze 
in the screen. 
By applying the eye-tracking system, participant's eye movement (towards 
versus away from the image), fixation frequency (number of times that a participant 
directs and redirects gaze to the image), and fixation time on a particular image can 
be measured. Researchers advocating this paradigm suggest that eye movements are 
rapid, naturalistic, and normally automatic. People commonly look at stimuli that 
attract their attention, that is, those stimuli with greatest personal significance and 
interest (Jonides, 1981; Klein, Kingstone, & Pontefract, 1995). Under normal 
viewing conditions, eye movement and fixation should closely follow and are leaded 
by shifts in attention (Kowler, 1995). Hence, the proportion of viewing time spent on 
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pictures with particular emotional valence should be a valid measure of attentional 
bias towards those stimuli. 
Eizenman and colleagues (2003), with the use of this experimental paradigm, 
provided evidences for attentional bias towards dysphoric images in a group of 
participants with diagnosis of current major depressive disorder (Eizenman et al., 
2003). In their study, two groups of participants (normal control and depressed group) 
were presented with slides of pictures. On each slide, there were four types of images 
printed on them: social, threatening, dysphoric, and neutral theme. They found that 
their depressed participants spent significantly more time fixating on dysphoric 
images, compared with the control group. Also, these participants exhibited larger 
average glance duration on dysphoric images than control, but not on the other 
themes. Hermans, Vansteenwegen, and Eelen (1999)，also showed that individuals 
with spider anxiety look more at spiders pictures, relative to flowers，at the beginning 
of stimuli presentation. 
Although the naturalistic visual scanning paradigm seems to be very useful 
for indicating attentional bias, we would, however, speculate its validity as a direct 
measurement tool. Actually, it is commonly recognized that what we are looking at 
does not necessarily be the subject we are attending to. Our eyes do sometimes cheat. 
Indeed, it is a common experience that we gaze at something while paying attention 
to some other kinds of stimuli in our surrounding, or even daydreaming. For people 
with emotional problems, the situation is more obvious. These individuals always 
ruminate in their past experiences or self-generated thoughts (e.g., Muris, Roelofs, 
Rassin, Franken, & Mayer, 2005; Rimes & Watkins, 2005; Wupperman & Neumann, 
2006). They tend to pick up only part of the external information and generate the 
rest themselves. In other words, they do have a moment attending to an incoming 
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external stimulus, but shortly after that, they shift their attention to attend instead to 
some internal stimulations. Therefore, in a naturalistic visual scanning task, even 
though emotional disturbed participants may spend significantly longer duration to 
fixate on an emotion-congruent image, they can be no longer attending to the 
stimulus after the very initial glance of it. 
Indeed, what the paradigm is detecting can be visual avoidance from the 
specific stimulus. Participants may avoid viewing a particular stimulus after knowing 
its emotional nature, and shift their vision to some unrelated or neutral stimuli. 
Especially in anxious individuals, it is unlikely for them to view more often to those 
emotion-congruent, that is, fear inducing stimuli. One should note, however, that 
visual avoidance is not equal to attentional avoidance. People with emotional 
problems may withdraw their vision from the source of mood irritation, but at the 
same time, they can be highly attentive to it. Hence, validity of results obtained from 
such a task is doubtful. The naturalistic visual scanning task is neither capable of 
taking into account this visual avoidance problem nor the attention shift problem 
mentioned earlier. 
Dot probe Task 
Dot probe task may be the most frequently used experimental paradigm in 
studying attentional bias. There is a family of dot probe paradigms with more or less 
the same basic task structure but different modifications (e.g., probe detection task, 
attentional probe task, and attention deployment task, etc.). 
The original version of dot probe paradigm was developed by MacLeod, 
Mathews, and Tata in 1986. In each experimental trial, a word pair is presented for a 
fixed duration (500ms in the original study), with one word above and one word 
below the center of the computer screen. In critical trials, one of the words is an 
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emotional word (e.g., threatening) and the other is neutral. After the 500ms-
presentation, a dot probe appears in one of the locations previously occupied by the 
word stimuli. Participants are instructed to read the upper word on each trial and to 
press a button as soon as they see the probe. In this paradigm, reaction time (RT) to 
press the button at the presence of the dot probe is used as a measure of visual 
attention towards the word preceded the dot. This original version of dot probe 
paradigm has been modified by a number of researchers. Types of modifications 
include: abandon of instruction to name the stimuli, use of cues, probe identification 
(e.g., whether it is an "E" or "F") or classification (e.g., whether the dot appears at 
right or left of the screen), and variation of stimulus presentation duration, etc. 
Regardless of the modifications, they base on more or less the same rationale. 
In the dot probe paradigm, it is suggested that participants will be faster to 
detect a dot that follows a previously attended stimulus (may it be a word or a 
pictorial stimulus). Therefore, participants with emotional disorders will take shorter 
time to detect the dot when it is preceded by an emotional word, compared to a 
neutral word. In accordance with the model of attention, the stimulus pair presented 
in a dot probe task is first processed unconsciously and meanings recognized 
automatically. At the same time, there is an activation of the corresponding 
information nodes in our cognitive system. For individuals with depression, 
cognitive structure related to dysphoric information is strongly activated if there is a 
depression-related stimulus; while, for individuals with anxiety, cognitive structure 
related to threatening or danger information is strongly activated if a threat-related 
stimulus is presented instead. These activations result in feedback from the 
corresponding schemas to direct attention towards the emotional stimuli respectively. 
Thus, when emotionally disturbed participants are attending to an emotion-congruent 
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stimulus and allocating resources for fully processing of that stimulus, the sudden 
replacement of the attended stimulus by a dot probe will result in unintentional 
placing of attentional resources to the dot. As a result, detection of the dot will 
become faster. 
A number of studies using variations of dot probe task did succeed in 
providing evidences for attentional bias towards emotion-congruent stimuli in 
individuals with depression or anxiety. Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue, and Joormann 
(2004), for example, presented participants with emotional-neutral facial expression 
pairs in their experiment. One of the photos was showed in the right, and the other in 
the left of the screen. Following the disappearance of the pictures, a small gray dot 
appeared in one of the locations previously occupied by the pictures. Participants 
were instructed to detect the presence of the dot in the left or right by pressing a 
button correspondingly. Gotlib et al. (2004) found that when their clinical 
participants with diagnosis of major depressive disorder were presented with the 
pairs of faces, the participants detected the dot faster when it followed the location of 
the emotional faces. Specifically, the participants showed shortened response time 
only when the dot was preceded by a sad face. Therefore, Gotlib et al. (2004) 
concluded that their depressed participants demonstrated an attentional bias towards 
sad faces, but not angry or happy faces. There are also evidences for attentional bias 
in anxious participants. Bradley and colleagues (1998), Taghavi and colleagues 
(1999), and Musa and colleagues (2003)，for example, found attentional biases 
towards threat-related words, threatening faces, and social-threat words, respectively, 
in groups of children, adolescent, and adult with primary diagnosis of generalized 
anxiety disorder, social disorder, or high trait anxiety (Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & 
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Hamilton, 1998; Musa, Lepine, Clark, Mansell, & Ehlers, 2003; Taghavi, Neshat-
Doost, Moradi, Yule, & Dalgleish, 1999). 
Despite the emergence of some convergent evidences, not all empirical 
results provided in the literature are consistently supportive (e.g., Chen, Ehlers, Clark, 
& Mansell, 2002; Lees, Mogg, & Bradley, 2005; Neshat-Doost, Moradi, Taghavi, 
Yule, & Dalgleish，2000; Pineles & Mineka, 2005). Validity of the dot probe 
paradigm in testing attentional bias is still questionable. Firstly, the task itself 
actually does not demand much attentional resources. In most dot probe experiments, 
as they are named, the task of participants is simple detection of the presence of a dot 
in the screen. To accomplish such a task, very few cognitive resources are needed. 
As long as the participant is looking at the computer screen, he or she can 
accomplish the task without actually attending to it. This is due to the routine nature 
of the task and the sole existence of non-stimulating stimuli. Indeed, this is similar to 
the daily life situation with workers in a production line continuing their handwork 
while chatting with each other. Thus, in a dot probe task, researchers may be tracking 
participants' instant location of eye fixation rather than their selective attention. The 
measure of reaction time in a dot probe task may be parallel to the tracking of eye 
movement (and fixation) in a naturalistic scanning paradigm- they indicate 
participants' point of eye gaze, but not essentially attention bias. What makes it differ 
from the naturalistic scanning task is that, the dot probe task tracks participants' 
momentary eye fixation (i.e., snapshot of eye movement) instead of providing a 
continuous record of eye movement. 
Following closely to the first argument, the dot probe paradigm, similar to a 
naturalistic scanning paradigm, over-sighted an important aspect of attention. As a 
criticism to the naturalistic scanning paradigm, what we are gazing at does not 
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necessarily indicate what we are attending to. Especially for people with emotional 
disorders, external stimuli cannot attract prolonged attention. These individuals tend 
to attend to internal self-generated stimuli after a prompt collection of external 
information. Therefore, in a dot probe task, the participants may be no longer 
attending to the word or pictorial stimuli at the time the dot appears. 
Emotional Stroop Color-naming Task 
In a typical Stroop color-naming task used for measuring attentional bias in 
emotionally disturbed individuals, participants are presented with words in different 
colors (e.g., red, yellow, green, and blue), and with different levels of emotional 
value or semantic contents (e.g., sad, threat-related, and happy). Although the 
participants are instructed to simply name the color while ignoring the content of the 
words, many studies found that participants' reaction latencies varied in response to 
the change of emotional valence of the words (e.g., Taghavi, Dalgleish, Moradi, 
Neshat-Doost, & Yule, 2003; Zeijlmans van Emmichoven, van Ijzendoorn, de Ruiter, 
& Brosschot, 2003). Usually, participant's reaction time (RT) to name the color is 
used as an index of emotional interference of the word content. As Taghavi et al. 
(2003) explained, "The argument goes that the degree to which the semantic content 
(or the emotional valence) of a given word interferes with the participants' ability to 
name its color is an index of how much the content of the word captures the 
participants' attention in some way." (pp. 222). Hence, if the content of a word 
stimulus is associated with the participant's personal concerns and thus distracts 
him/her from the task, the participant will exhibit slower reaction time compared 
with trials with word stimuli containing little personal relevance. 
In this sense, when we use the Stroop paradigm to measure attentional bias, 
we are actually tapping the competition between active and passive attentional 
,�.:.�...‘�.�Attentional Bi s in Depression and Anxiety 20 
processes. As discussed earlier, an ordinal attentional process should be an active one 
in which an individual intentionally direct his or her cognitive resources to the target 
stimulus (which most likely is the information that has greatest person significance to 
the individual). In a Stroop task, participants are instructed to attend solely to the 
color of the visual stimuli. Thus, in this situation, colors of the words become more 
important to the participants. However, in participants with heightened vulnerability 
to depression or anxiety, the basic cognitive structure responsible for dysphoric (for 
depressed individuals) or threat-related (for anxious individuals) information is more 
potent, and the negative information itself has acquired elevated degree of personal 
relevance to the individuals. Thus, simple unconscious stimulation at the pre-
attentive stage is already sufficient to initiate feedback from the corresponding 
cognitive schemas, resulting in unintended, passive attention shift to this task-
irrelevant information (i.e., the word content). 
Power of the Stroop paradigm rests on the emotional interference that follows. 
Once an individual is distracted by the word content, there will be a short, but 
significant attention shift to internal stimulation. Although the participants are 
generally successful in re-directing attention back to the experimental task, the 
emotional interference resulted is obvious and will reflect in delayed response 
latency. 
The use of Stroop color-naming paradigm to demonstrate attentional bias in 
patients with emotional problems is in general successful, according to a review by 
Williams, Mathews, and Macleod (1996). For example, Mathews and MacLeod 
(1985) showed a slowed color-naming response to threat-related words, relative to 
mildly positive words, in a group of clinical adult patients with diagnosis of 
generalized anxiety disorder. They suggested that the results indicate a selective 
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attentional processing of threat-related information in their participants. Mathews 
and MacLeod also found a significant correlation between the attentional bias 
measure and patients' self-reported state anxiety level. Two more recent studies 
using this experimental paradigm also provided consistent evidences for interference 
in color-naming of emotional words in similar participant groups. Taghavi and 
colleagues (2003) found that their clinical group of children and adolescents with 
generalized anxiety disorder was slower to color-name threat words, compared to 
neutral words, but did not differ from normal control group for color-name of either 
depression-related words or positive words. Similarly, Zeijlmans van Emmichoven 
and colleagues (2003) showed that compared to the normal control group, those 
outpatients with anxiety disorders exhibited larger interference from threatening 
words. 
The Stroop color-naming paradigm seems to be the best experimental 
paradigm among the three. However, again, some null findings have been shown in 
past studies using the Stroop color-naming task (e.g., Kindt & Brosschot, 1999; 
Teachman, 2005; Yovel & Mineka, 2005). Moreover, it has been argued that many 
other explanations may also be possible alternative explanations to the findings. 
MacLeod (1991) and MacLeod et al. (1986), for example, criticized that an increased 
emotional interference observed could arise from some non-attentive related 
processes. Specifically, the emotional stimuli may trigger some task-irrelevant 
processes such as negative thoughts, which compete for attentional resources and 
produce the interference effect observed. It is equally possible that the interference 
effect may arise from a cognitive effort to suppress the processing of the distracting 
emotional information during the experiment (e.g., De Ruiter & Brosschot, 1994). 
Therefore, the paradigm cannot provide a clear measure of attentional bias. 
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Researchers cannot assure that the color-naming interference reflects competition at 
input or attentional stage, rather than output or response selection stage of the task 
(MacLeod, 1991; Ruiter & Brosschot, 1994; Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 2000; Nunn, 
Mathews, & Trower, 1997). 
Similarly, Vasey and MacLeod (2001) commented that Stroop task has been 
shown to be a fairly unreliable method in the demonstration of selective attention 
toward feared stimuli in children with specific fears. They suggested that at least 
three possible factors contribute to the inconsistent findings in research using 
modified Stroop task. Firstly, the modified Stroop effect is weak and so, it may be 
difficult to replicate in nonclinical populations who have low anxiety level (e.g., in 
Williams et al., 1996, 1997). Secondly, there may exist some general task factors 
(e.g., number of experimental trials) that strongly influence the results of the studies. 
Finally, the choice of participants also matters a lot. Generally speaking, it is found 
that emotional interference effect is stronger in older participants than younger 
children. 
In view of the importance of these task and participant factors, we will 
therefore discuss several most influential ones to see their roles in affecting the 
investigation of selective attention in people with emotional vulnerability. 
Stimulus Presentation Duration 
The duration of which a stimulus is exposed to participants is critical to the 
exhibition of selective attention. In past studies, time period presented ranged from 
subliminal presentation (e.g., 14.3ms in Zeijlmans van Emmichoven et al , 2003; 
20ms in MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker，2002; 50ms in 
Mathews, Ridgeway, & Williamson, 1996)，to commonly adopted 500ms (e.g., 
Bradley et al., 1998; Chen et al., 2002; Mansell, Clark, Ehlers, & Chen，1999; Mogg 
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& Bradley, 1999; Neshat-Doost et al., 2000; Wilson & MacLeod, 2003), and to 
longer duration of more than 1000ms (e.g., Hermans et al, 1999; Mansell, Clark, & 
Ehlers, 2003). However, the use of short presentation time did not always 
demonstrate attentional bias in anxious participants. Similarly, researchers could not 
always show selective attention in depressed people by using long presentation 
duration. Empirical evidences suggest that discriminative use of very short or long 
stimulus presentation duration is not a valid way to demonstrate the different 
selective attentional patterns in people with depression or anxiety. 
As hypothesized, before a stimulus is attended and further processing carried 
out, it first enters a stage of pre-attentive processing. Processing in this stage is 
unconscious, rapid, and automatic. We can neither control nor stop it. In this stage, 
all stimuli undergo preliminary encoding process and unconscious recognition is 
achieved. This, in turn, activates the underlying cognitive structure corresponding to 
the content or emotional status of the stimuli, and those with greater personal 
relevance are then selectively attended. Therefore, if a stimulus is presented very 
briefly and subliminally, what are measured in the study will simply be some vague, 
unknown, and unconscious encoding processes. In this sense, we cannot be certain 
what we have measured under very short stimulus presentation duration. 
For long presentation duration, it can be quite sure that stimulus processing 
has already passed through the pre-attentive stage. However, one should note that it 
is possible for the processing to have gone beyond attentional stage either. Indeed, 
time provided is so long that it may allow more than initial attention directing, but 
also attentional shift for many times. As mentioned in the discussion of experimental 
paradigms, information from the computer screen is usually impoverished and 
stimulations are so few that attention shifting during the task is very natural and 
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expectable. Thus, the longer time is available, the less predictable the location of 
attention. Location of later fixation or pattern of change of attention may depend on 
the severity of the individual's emotional problem. Indeed, McCabe and Toman 
(2000) found that across presentation duration (from 750ms, 1000ms, 1250ms, to 
1500ms), dysphoric participants showed no preference for negative adjectives over 
positive or neutral adjectives. In contrast, unstable nondysphoric group displayed 
more avoidance of negative stimuli than stable non-dysphoric group, while the 
nondysphoric participants showed a protective bias from negative stimuli. 
Presentation duration is a complicated factor to the detection of attentional 
bias that too short or too long durations are both inappropriate. It is difficult to know 
precisely the time needed for an external stimulus to be attended. Hence, we may 
rather consider using indices of selective attention that are less seriously influenced 
by presentation duration. As discussed earlier, emotional interference from the 
stimulus may be a fair index of attentional bias. 
Presentation Frequency (Number of Test Trials) 
Number of trials of a task affects the strategies participants used in an 
experiment. In the Stroop task and dot probe task, participants are instructed to 
respond as fast as they can. Hence, they will naturally try to develop some kinds of 
strategy so as to facilitate their performance and to increase speed. In the dot probe 
task, presentation duration of the stimuli is restricted (assuming just over threshold). 
Also, the dot probe appears evenly in positions preceded by all types of stimuli 
(emotional or neutral). Therefore, the participants can hardly develop any strategy to 
improve their task performance. However, in a Stroop task, there is usually longer 
stimuli presentation duration. The pace of experiment is slower and more time is 
available for participants to develop strategies to enhance performance. More 
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importantly, in this task, detection for details is not necessary. What is needed is the 
simple identification of the color of the stimuli, instead of searching a dot in the 
words. As summarized by Galotti (1999)， 
“.. . today the appropriate metaphor (for attention) seems to be a 
spotlight. The idea here is that attention can vary in effectiveness, just 
as a spotlight, aimed at one spot, more or less lights surrounding areas, 
depending on its size and intensity." (p. 122). 
Hence in a Stroop task, after a few trials, participants will leam to put effort to 
reduce the interference produced from the word stimulus by consciously ignoring its 
content. They may try to focus away from the center of the word and attend only to 
its marginal region so as to avoid automatic reading. Therefore, with increased 
number of trials, there will be more practices, and strategy for response can become 
more mature and well developed. This results in better performance and weaker 
emotional interference from the stimuli. Indeed, Stroop (1935) demonstrated that 
with extensive practices at color-naming, his participants were less seriously 
interfered by the word contents. 
Participant/Group Characteristics 
Last but not least, characteristics of the comparison groups also play an 
essential role as to whether we can find evidences for attentional bias in individuals 
with depression or anxiety. It is well known that depression and anxiety often appear 
comorbidly (e.g., De Graaf, Bijl, Sniit, Vollebergh, & Spijker, 2002; Stein et al., 
2001; Zimmerman, McDermut, & Mattia, 2000). Therefore, technically, it is difficult 
to categorize these two groups of participants into pure diagnostic groups. Indeed, 
there rarely has any study endeavored to construct pure groups of depression and 
anxiety with single emotional problem (e.g., Neshat-Doost et al., 2000; Taghavi et al., 
2003). Most participants in the so-called "depression" or "anxiety" group actually 
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have comorbid depression and anxiety. As a consequence, even sometimes 
researchers did find attentional bias towards emotion-congruent stimuli in their 
participants, the results are questionable. 
For example, Mogg, Millar, and Bradley (2000) investigated their 
participants' selective attention towards three types of facial expressions: threatening 
(angry/hostile), sad, and happy. They found no attentional bias across three groups of 
participants (depressed, anxious, and control) when using reaction time bias scores as 
the index of selective attention. When participants' eye movement measures were 
used in comparison instead, they revealed a more frequent and quick shift of gaze 
towards threat faces in the anxious group, as compared with the control and 
depressed group, which showed no evidence for bias towards any kind of facial 
expression. These results contradicted to the popular prediction of selective attention 
favoring depression-related (sad) stimuli in depressive individuals. However, an 
examination of the patients' characteristics revealed that the findings were, actually, 
artificial. The anxious group in this study could be regarded as a pure generalized 
anxiety disorder (GAD) group. Participants in this group had a diagnosis of GAD 
with absence of major depressive disorder (MDD) or dysthymia. Also, they had 
comparatively low scores on the depression scales (e.g., the Beck Depression 
Inventory), but high anxiety scores (e.g., trait and state anxiety as measured by the 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory). However, though participants in the depressed group 
did have a MDD or dysthymia diagnosis, high percentage of participants in the group 
also had concurrent anxiety diagnoses. Moreover, they simultaneously scored highly 
in the depression and anxiety measures (comparable to those of the anxious group). 
Thus, it seems more appropriate to treat the "depressed group" as having comorbid 
depression/anxiety. Coincidentally, if we consider Mogg et al.'s (2000) participant 
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groups in this way, results will match nicely with findings reported by Taghavi et al. 
(1999): both studies showed no attentional bias towards either threat- or depression-
related stimuli in people with comorbid depression/anxiety. Hence, it is theoretically 
important to have well demarcated groups of participants. 
Moreover, most questionnaires for emotional problem were not developed for 
diagnostic propose. They are not sensitive enough for discrimination of participants. 
Some researchers, for example, argued that the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; 
Spielberger, Gorsiich, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) is not a pure measure for 
anxiety. Instead, it contains some items that overlap with the depression construct. 
Indeed, it is quite common to found STAI scores significantly correlate with scales 
measuring depression (Mathew et al., 1996). 
The Present Study 
In the present study, we attempted to introduce a new experimental paradigm, 
the negative priming paradigm, to examine attentional bias in individuals with 
depression and anxiety. 
Negative Priming Paradigm 
The negative priming paradigm is an experimental paradigm commonly used 
in the study of deficit in cognitive inhibition (e.g., Avila & Antonia Parcet, 1997; 
Dorahy, Middleton, & Irwin, 2005; Enright, Beech, & Claridge, 1995; Joormann, 
2004; MacQueen, Tipper, Young, Joffe, & Levitt, 2000; Moritz, Mass, & Junk, 
1998). In a typical trial of a negative priming experiment, participants will be 
presented with a prime display followed by a probe display. In both displays, two 
stimuli (say, two words), a target and a distractor, will be presented simultaneously 
on the screen where participants are instructed to name the target stimulus and ignore 
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the distractor stimulus. It is revealed that in normal population, if the probe target is 
identical to or semantically related to the ignored prime distractor, participants will 
respond to the probe target slower compared with unrelated prime distractor and 
probe target. This is the so-called negative priming effect. 
Negative priming effect is often regarded as a result of our underlying 
inhibitory processes. In order to react correctly in the priming task, internal 
representation of the target must be highly activated while activation of that of the 
distractor be considerably suppressed. The effect of inhibitory processing of the 
distractor in the prime trial, however, persists to the probe trial, and results in delayed 
response to the probe target when it is identical or related to the prime distractor. 
Nevertheless, comprehensive investigation of the phenomenon revealed two 
intriguing properties of negative priming effect that can hardly be explained by 
inhibitory processes. Firstly, in order to demonstrate negative priming, it is necessary 
for the probe trial to be a selective task. That is, the probe trial must be one that 
requires the participants to select between a target and a distractor. In contrast, prime 
selection is not essential for negative priming effect to occur. Indeed, delayed 
response in the probe task can also be found even after a brief presentation of a 
single-item prime identical or related to the probe target. Inhibitory processing 
mechanism hypothesis cannot provide sufficient account to explain these empirical 
findings (Milliken, Joordens, Merikle, & Seiffert，1998). 
Through a series of experiments, Milliken et al. (1998) examined the 
phenomenon of negative priming effect and proposed an alternative explanation for 
the underlying mechanism. This is the temporal discrimination account. According to 
the temporal discrimination hypothesis, we unconsciously compare the identity of the 
probe target with the preceded prime during a negative priming trial. This process is 
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accomplished by two systems: the automatic retrieval system and the orienting 
system. The automatic retrieval system is responsible for detecting similarity 
between the perceptual representation of the probe target and the memorial 
representation of the prime, whereas the orienting system is responsible for 
difference detection. These two systems work together to provide a "same or 
different" or "old or new" decision of the current probe target. Determination of the 
probe target as "same" or "old" means that the probe target is related to or matches 
with the preceded prime, while determination of the probe target as "different" or 
"new" implies that the probe target is unrelated to the preceded prime and is new to 
the person. 
A "same" or "old" decision will lead to the adoption of the automatic 
retrieval process (temporal integration) to reinstate prior learning and thus, result in a 
quick response to the current probe (positive priming effect). This is the case when a 
stimulus is attended in the prime (i.e., the prime target) and appears again as the 
target in the probe trial (attended repetition). In contrary, if the probe target is 
regarded as different from the prime, that is, when a "different" or "new" decision is 
made, the orienting system (temporal differentiation) will alert the person to undergo 
more detailed perceptual analysis of the stimulus and longer response time is needed. 
This is the case when the probe target is neither related to the prime target nor the 
prime distractor (unrepeated control). Negative priming effect occurs when the probe 
target is different from the prime target, but is the same as or related to the prime 
distractor (ignored repetition). Since participants are instructed to pay attention only 
to the target and ignore the distractor in every trial, therefore, in normal condition, 
the prime distractor is unattended regardless of its identity. Nevertheless, as 
discussed before, it has actually been processed to a certain degree unconsciously. As 
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a result, discrimination between the mental representations of the prime and the 
probe target becomes more difficult. Under such situation, the probe target can 
neither be regarded as "new" (since it is the same as the prime distractor) nor can it 
be regarded as "old" (as the prime distractor is not attended in the prime trial). This 
intermediate quality of match between the perceptual representation of a probe target 
and the memorial representation of the prime results in an ambiguity in the 
identification of the probe target, making it difficult to be categorized as "new" but 
yet insufficient to be regarded as "old", and therefore, much longer duration is 
needed for response. 
In this sense, the time required to respond to the probe target is non-
monotonically related to the quality of match between the perceptual representation 
of the probe target and the memorial representation of the prime. Minimum response 
time is needed in a perfect match between the probe target and the preceded prime 
target, whereas, longest response time will be resulted when the match between the 
probe target and the prime is intermediate (i.e., when the probe target is the same as 
the prime distractor). 
According to the discriminative processing mechanism, negative priming is, 
however, highly dependent on probe selection and disappears if no selection is 
required in the probe trial. Under probe selection situation, a source of error to 
performance is introduced. The temporal discriminative strategy of information 
processing becomes highly important to control the level of potential error. In 
contrast, if the probe task requires only simple identification of a lone probe stimulus, 
comparison between perceptual representation of the probe and the memorial 
representation of the prime becomes much less important and performance will 
depend monotonically to the degree of similarity or match between the probe and 
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prime. In effect, negative priming can no longer be observed even when the probe is 
related to the prime distractor. Contrarily, the negative priming effect is independent 
of prime selection. Once an ambiguity of old-new categorization is produced, 
negative priming effect emerges in spite of the nature of the prime task. In other 
word, as long as the preceded prime is related to the probe target but is not attended 
(similar to the situation of a prime distractor in ignored repetition condition discussed 
above), a single-item prime can be sufficient to induce negative priming effect 
(Milliken et al., 1998). 
Negative Priming and Depression and Anxiety 
An implication from Milliken et al.'s (1998) temporal discrimination 
hypothesis is thus, whether a negative priming effect can be observed or not is 
largely dependent on the "attentional state" of the prime stimuli, provided that the 
probe task is a selection trial. In a single-item prime condition, for example, with 
repeated or related probe target, positive priming occurs when the prime is attended, 
whereas, negative priming becomes the case when the prime is processed but not 
particularly attended. This provides a basis for our study of content-specific 
attentional bias in individuals with depression and anxiety. 
We argued that in normal population, negative priming effect can be seen 
whenever the probe target is related to the prime distractor, or to a briefly presented 
single-item prime. It is because these people will simply ignore the prime distractor 
or the single-item prime as they are not task-relevant. However, for people with 
depression or anxiety, since they possess a depressogenic/danger schema, they are 
vigilance to sad- or threat-related stimuli and will attend particularly to any stimulus 
that has similar emotional content as their maladaptive schemas. So, they will attend 
particularly to the prime distractor/the single-item prime in a negative priming task 
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whenever the stimulus is congruent with their emotional problems, even though it is 
task-irrelevant. As a result, we will not be able to find similar priming effect in 
depressed or anxious individuals as what we find in normal people. Attention to the 
prime distractor/single-item prime may cease any negative priming effect that would 
have been observed and produce reduced negative priming or even positive priming 
effect in people with depression or anxiety. 
Past research employing negative priming paradigm in the clinical setting 
have reported reduced negative priming effect in participants with depression (e.g., 
Joormann, 2004) and obsessive-compulsive disorder (e.g., Enright et al., 1995). 
However, such kind of studies is very limited and they tend to conclude by 
attributing to a deficit of the cognitive inhibition mechanism of the participants, 
which, as discussed above, may not be an appropriate explanation to the 
phenomenon. Moreover, there rarely has any research comparing negative priming 
effect in individuals with depression and anxiety simultaneously in the same study. 
Therefore, in this study, we tried to apply the negative priming paradigm and 
Milliken et al.'s (1998) temporal discrimination hypothesis to investigate content-
specific attentional bias in individuals with depression and anxiety. 
In order to examine emotion-congruent attentional bias in participants with 
different emotional vulnerabilities, a modified negative priming paradigm was used 
in the current study with sad- and threat-related words as stimuli. Participants were 
presented with a brief single-item prime following a probe selection task. Emotional 
valence of the prime-probe target pairs was varied so as to produce different 
conditions for the comparison and examination of negative priming effect in sad-
related and threat-related words. Given the positive findings by Joormann (2004), 
who used a negative priming experiment, we could be confident that our present 
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similar experiment should be able to document the phenomenon of biased attention 
in people with emotional problems. We expected that individuals with depression or 
anxiety would have a tendency to attend to the emotion-corresponding prime words. 
Therefore, contrast to normal individuals, depressed participants would attend to sad 
word stimuli selectively and, as a result, reduced negative priming or positive 
priming effect was expected to see when they were presented with sad-related prime 
and probe target words (i.e., in sad prime-probe target condition); whereas, for 
anxious participants, they would selectively attend to threat-related words and thus, 
when they were presented with threat-related prime and probe target words (i.e., in 
threat prime-probe target condition), a reduced negative priming effect or a positive 
priming effect would be seen. Following logically, reduced negative priming effect 
(or positive priming effect) to both types of emotional words was expected to find in 
participants with both depression and anxiety. 




A total of 204 undergraduate students (74 male, 130 female) from The 
Chinese University of Hong Kong was recruited to participate in the present study. 
Data from nine participants were discarded due to large amount of errors produced in 
the experiment and/or missing data in the questionnaires, and only data from 
participants who met the grouping requirements were used in the present analyses. 
Data of a total of 34.3% of participants were discarded. Mean age of the final 134 
participants (52 male, 82 female) was 20.1 (SD = 1.1, range = 18 to 23). All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and normal color 
differentiation ability, with Cantonese as primary spoken language. 
Self-Report Measures 
The participants were categorized into four groups: 1) Comorbid 
Depression/Anxiety (i.e., high depression, high anxiety), 2) Depression (i.e., high 
depression, low anxiety), 3) Anxiety (i.e., low depression, high anxiety), and 4) 
Normal Control (i.e., low depression, low anxiety), based on their scores on the Beck 
Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) and Beck Anxiety 
Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988). 
The Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck et al.，1996) is a widely 
used, 21-item self-report questionnaire assessing the presence and severity of 
depressive symptomatology in accordance with DSM-IV criteria in adolescents and 
adults. Each item scores from 0 to 3, yielding a total score of 0 to 63. The higher the 
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score an individual obtains, the more severe the distress. BDI-II has been shown to 
have good psychometric properties (e.g., Al-Musawi, 2001; Dozois, Dobson, & 
Ahnberg, 1998; Sprinkle et al., 2002; Steer & Clark, 1997)，and the Cronbach's 
coefficient alpha of BDI-II for the present sample was .85. 
The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck et al., 1988)，on the other hand, is a 
commonly used, well-validated 21-item self-report questionnaire for the assessment 
of the severity of anxiety symptomatology. Similar to BDI, each item scores from 0 
to 3, and thus, resulting in a total score from 0 to 63. Higher scores indicate more 
severe anxiety symptoms. It has also been shown to have good psychometric 
properties (e.g., Beck et al., 2001; Fydrich, Dowdall, & Chambless，1992; Hewitt & 
Norton, 1993), and the Cronbach's coefficient alpha of BAI for the present sample 
was .86. These two scales were used to group participants because both of them have 
been demonstrated to be effective in discriminating between students with different 
levels of depression or anxiety (e.g., Sprinkle et a l , 2002). 
In order to obtain participants with comparatively severe emotional problems, 
those scored on the top 20% of either scale were treated as having high level of the 
respective problems (depression or anxiety); while, those who scored at the bottom 
65% of the sample in each scales were regarded as having low level of the respective 
emotional problems. The choice of the cutoff at the upper and lower levels was 
admittedly arbitrary, but there were well thought-out reasons for them. The upper 
cutoff level of 80%ile was chosen to be high enough to allow inclusion of 
participants of relatively severe emotional conditions, but on the other hand to be 
able to include a sufficient sample size of participants for statistical comparisons. 
Meanwhile, the lower cutoff level of 65%ile was close to half of one standard 
derivation above mean, which allowed inclusion of participants whom we would 
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consider as normal or average. As a much lower cutoff, say 20%ile, would produce a 
"super normal" group. Together, this procedure of grouping permitted the 
comparison between individuals with relatively "pure" depression or anxiety and 
normal participants who have low level of depression and anxiety. 
Mean scores on BDI-II and B Al of the four groups are shown in Table 1. 
According to the cut-off scores recommended by the BDI-II manual, most of the 
participants grouped in the Comorbid and Depression Group had mild to moderate 
level of depression (scores ranged from 16 to 27)，with a few participants with severe 
depression (scores > 28); whereas those in the non-depression groups had minimal 
level of depression (scores < 12). Similarly, according to the cut-off scores 
recommended by the BAI manual, most participants belonged to the Comorbid and 
Anxiety Groups showed a mild to moderate level of anxiety (scores ranged from 15 
to 23), with a few participants scored at the severe range (scores > 25); while those 
participants in the non-anxiety groups scored at the minimal to mild range of anxiety 
(scores <11) . Results from multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) indicated 
that the problem groups have significantly higher scores on the corresponding 
depression/anxiety scale than those without the emotional problem {p < .001). Mean 
depression/anxiety scores of the three problem groups in the present study were 
comparable to those diagnosed with depressive or anxiety disorder in Cheng and 
colleagues' study on Hong Kong psychiatric out-patients (Cheng et al., 2002). There 
were generally more females than males in all groups of participants (mean 
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Apparatus and Stimuli 
Sixty two-character Chinese words with three types of emotional valences, 
neutral, sad, and threat-related, were used in the present experiment. These consisted 
of 12 sad-related words, 12 threat-related words, and 36 neutral words. To select 
words for use in this experiment, a total of 187 candidate Chinese emotional words 
was first generated and presented to five graduate student raters. The raters judged 
independently on a 7-point scale the level of sadness and threat of the words (1 = no 
emotion, 7 = extreme emotion). The final three sets of two-character words were 
selected based on these emotional ratings. The sad-related word set comprised of 
words receiving an average rating greater than 4 (with 4 representing moderate 
valence) on the sadness scale, but less than 4 on the threat scale. While, the threat-
related word set included words rated averagely greater than 4 on the threat scale, 
less than 4 on the sadness scale. Finally, average ratings of words in the neutral set 
were all less than 2 on all emotion scales. Mean ratings of sadness and threat of each 
type of words as well as their mean application frequencies are shown in Table 2. It 
turned out that it was impossible to find words relating to sadness and threat which 
had identical application frequencies (Liu, Zhung, & Wang, 1975). Instead, we tried 
hard to identify neutral words whose application frequencies came close to words 
related to sad or threat. 
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Table 2 
Mean Ratings of Sadness and Threat on the Three types of Words, and their Mean 
Application Frequencies 
Scale 
Words Frequency Count (SD) 
Sadness (SD) Threat (SD) 
6.47 (.37) 3.41 (.24) 11.25 (7.98) 
Threat 3.10 (.32) 6.30 (.25) 33.82 (36.22) 
Neutral 1.08 (.17) 1.23 (.29) 20.72 (7.40) 
Note. The scales for rating of level of sadness and threat were 7-point Likert scales 
with 1 = no emotion, 7 = extreme emotion, and 4 = moderate emotion. Frequency 
counts of the words were obtained by calculating the usage of the words in a million-
word literature. 
In each trial, participants were presented briefly with a red single prime word 
followed by a probe display. In each probe display, two interleaved words, one above 
the other, were presented. One of the words was in red (the target) and the other in 
green (the distractor) (see Figure 1). Across the experiment, a random half of the 
displays had the red word appeared above the green word, and reversed in the other 
half. An imaginary rectangle surrounding the two words measured 46 x 15 mm. Each 
character measured 10x10 mm and there were horizontal spaces of 2 mm separating 
each character. 
書 龍 本 藏 
Figure 1. An example of stimuli used in the present study. The red target word (as 
depicted in unfilled character) was interleaved with the green distractor word (as 
depicted in filled character). 
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By varying the emotional valence of the prime and probe target, 5 
experimental conditions were produced with different prime-probe target 
combinations: sad-sad, neutral-sad, neutral-neutral (unrelated words), neutral-threat, 
and threat-threat. The probe distractor word was neutral across the experiment (Table 
3). On any given trial, three words were chosen pseudorandomly as the prime, probe 
target and probe distractor from the corresponding word sets. This selection 
procedure continued on consecutive trials without replacement until the complete 
sets of words were exhausted. All three sets of words then became eligible for 
selection again on subsequent trials. Order of experimental conditions was 
randomized in each subblock of trials. Within each subblock, there were 2 trials for 
each of the sad and threat-related word target condition and 4 for the neutral-neutral 
prime-probe target condition. 
Table 3 
Combinations of Prime and Probe Target in the Five Experimental Conditions 
Conditions Prime Probe Target Probe Distractor 
r S ^ S ^ Neutral 
2. Neutral Sad Neutral 
3.* Neutral Neutral Neutral 
4. Neutral Threat-related Neutral 
5. Threat-related Threat-related Neutral 
*Note. Unrelated neutral words were used in the neutral-neutral prime-probe target 
trials. 
Participants' response times (RTs) to the probe target were recorded and used 
for analyses. Effect of the priming manipulation was measured by subtracting mean 
RT of probe target in conditions with same prime-probe target emotional valence 
from those with different emotional valence. In other word, negative priming to sad 
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words was measured by mean RT in Condition 2 (neutral-sad) - mean RT in 
Condition 1 (sad-sad), while, negative priming to threat-related words was measured 
by mean RT in Condition 4 (neutral-threat) - mean RT in Condition 5 (threat-threat). 
A significant negative value indicated the present of negative priming effect, whereas, 
an insignificant difference indicated reduced negative priming effect, and a 
significant positive value indicated the present of positive priming. 
Procedure 
Each participant completed the experiment separately. They were sat at 
approximately 50 cm away from the computer screen and briefly explained 
procedure of the experiment. The participants started the experiment with the 
practice trials by pressing the space bar on the keyboard. Each trial began with a 
fixation marker presented at the center of the monitor with a black display 
background. The fixation marker was a white plus sign measured approximately 10 x 
10 mm and presented for 1000ms. After a 250ms blank interval, a premask appeared 
for 500ms, followed immediately by the prime word (presented in the same font as 
the probe target) for 100ms. It was suggested that 100ms presentation of the prime 
word would be an appropriate duration for the test of selective attention. The prime 
was then followed by a postmask of 500ms. The pre- and postmasks were symbols of 
that were presented at the same locations as the prime characters (see Figure 2). 
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i 晉不 ！ response was given or after 2000 ms 
Figure 2. The flow of a typical experimental trial. Participants were instructed to 
name the red word in the probe as fast and accurately as possible. 
Participants were instructed to focus at the center of the monitor throughout 
the experiment. They were told that they would see a series of words or markers (the 
premask, prime, and postmask) flickering on the screen. However, no reaction was 
required until they saw a simultaneous presentation of a red and a green word. 
Participants were instructed to respond by naming aloud the red word (the probe 
target) into a microphone which was connected to a unit that served both as a voice-
activated relay and as an input device to record the reaction time of the participants. 
Response times were calculated as the latency between the onset of the display and 
the onset of the participant's response, and participants were instructed to respond as 
fast and as accurately as possible. The probe display appeared and remained on the 
screen until the onset of the participant's response (Figure 2) or after 2000 ms, while 
accuracy of the responses was secretly coded by the experimenter sitting in the next 
partition in the same room. 
Participants first completed a practice session of 2 subblocks with 12 trials 
each before the experimental session began. The experimental sessions consisted of 2 
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blocks of 120 trials each, separated by a short break. Each block was divided into 10 
subblocks of 12 trials. The participants pressed the space bar to initiate the next 
subblock. The entire experiment took approximately 25 minutes. After the 
experiment, participants completed the depression and anxiety scales and were then 
debriefed. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Results 
Only data from correct responses were analyzed in the present study. 
Participants' response times (RTs) were first submitted into an outlier elimination 
procedure to exclude any suspiciously small or large RTs from further analyses. RTs 
smaller than 180 ms were discarded as it was suggested that it is not possible for 
adult's simple reaction time to be faster than 180 ms (Nuechterlein, 1983; 
0'Dougherty, Nuechterlein, & Drew, 1984; Seidel & Joschko, 1990; Welford, 1980). 
Mean RT of each condition for each participant was computed, and those RTs three-
standard derivation greater or smaller than his/her mean RTs of the corresponding 
conditions were also discarded. Trials with error rate across participants greater than 
three standard derivations of the mean error rate were also removed from calculation. 
These procedures resulted in the elimination of approximately 1.3% of the RTs. 
Finally, data from six outlier participants were excluded. The four participant groups 
did not differ significantly in mean error rate committed in the experiment (p > .10) 
(see Table 4). 
Effect of Experimental Manipulation 
Mean RT of each experimental condition was then computed for each of the 
remaining participants. Repeated measures analysis was performed treating 
participant group as the between-groiip variable and experimental condition as the 
within-group variable. Gender was entered as covariate. The mean RTs collapsed 
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Results from repeated measures analysis revealed significant main effect of 
experimental condition, F(4, 126) = 4.62, p < .01, but no significant main effect was 
found for group, gender, nor any interaction effect {p > .10). A significant linear 
change of RTs across the five experimental conditions was found, F(l , 129) = 17.22, 
p < .001. Mean RTs collapsed across all participants were computed for each 
experimental condition (see Table 4) and subjected to post hoc planned comparison 
analysis using repeated contrasts. Significant differences were found between 
Condition 1 (sad-sad) and Condition 2 (neutral-sad), F(l , 133)= 16.51,p < .001; 
Condition 2 (neutral-sad) and Condition 3 (neutral-neutral), F(l , 133) = 9.20，p < .01; 
and between Condition 4 (neutral-threat) and Condition 5 (threat-threat), F(l , 133)= 
65.18, /) < .001. No significant difference was found between Condition 3 (neutral-
neutral) and Condition 4 (neutral-threat), p > .10. Thus, generally, participants 
responded fastest when they were to read out a threat probe target word after the 
brief presentation of a prime with same emotional valence (Condition 5: threat-threat, 
RT = 582ms), and they responded slowest when both the prime and probe target 
were sad words (Condition 1: sad-sad, RT = 607ms). Participants responded faster to 
a neutral probe target than a sad target (Condition 3: neutral-neutral, RT = 594ms 
versus Condition 2: neutral-sad, RT = 601ms), but no difference to a threat target 
when the prime was neutral (Condition 3: neutral-neutral, RT 二 594ms versus 
Condition 4: neutral-threat, RT = 593ms) (see Figure 3). 
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Sad-Sad Neutral-Sad Neutral-Neutral Neutral-Threat Threat-Threat 
Experimental Condition* 
Figure 3. Mean response times (in milliseconds) across five experimental conditions. 
Note. *The first word in each pair indicates the emotional valence of the word 
presented in the prime and the second indicates the emotional valence of the word 
presented as the probe target. 
Priming Effect and Attentional Bias 
In order to examine our hypothesis of content-specific attentional bias in 
individuals with depression and/or anxiety, similar comparison analyses using 
repeated contrasts were performed separately for each participant group. 
Participants' mean RTs for various experimental conditions were compared, and any 
reduction of negative priming effect of each of the two types of emotional word was 
examined. Figures 4a to 4d depict the priming results for each group of participant 
(Figure 4a, Normal Control; 4b, Comorbid; 4c, Depression; 4d, Anxiety). Priming 
effect was measured by subtracting mean RT of conditions with same prime-probe 
target emotional valence from the corresponding neutral prime conditions. In other 
word, priming effect of sad words was measured by: 
Mean RT of Condition 2 (neutral-sad) - Mean RT of Condition 1 (sad-sad), 
and that of threat-related words was measured by: 
Mean RT of Condition 4 (neutral-threat) - Mean RT of Condition 5 (threat-threat). 
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While significant negative value indicated negative priming and thus no attentional 
bias, insignificant negative value indicated reduced negative priming effect and a 
tendency to selectively attending to the emotional word. Whereas, significant 
positive value would indicate positive priming effect, and reflect a salient attentional 
bias towards the corresponding emotional stimulus. 
As expected, significant difference between mean RT of Condition 2 (sad-sad) 
and Condition 1 (neutral-sad) was found in the Normal Control Group (low 
depression, low anxiety). Participants responded significantly slower to a sad probe 
target if they were firstly primed with a sad word, as compared with a neutral prime 
(Condition 2 — Condition 1 = -6ms), F{\, 87) = 46.31，；？ < .001，and thus, indicating a 
negative priming effect of and no selective attention towards sad words in this group 
of participant. However, in contrast, a significant positive difference was found for 
the threat-related word condition (Condition 4: neutral-threat - Condition 5: threat-
threat =11 ms), 87) = 8.18,/? < .01. Participants responded faster to a threat-
related target word when firstly primed with a word with same emotional valence, 
reflecting an unexpected positive priming effect of and attentional bias towards 
threat-related stimuli (Figure 4a). 
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Sad Words Threat-related Words 
Figure 4a. Priming effect in the Normal Control Group (low depression and anxiety). 
Priming effect of sad word was measure by mean RT of Condition 2 - mean RT of 
Condition 1 ； and that of threat-related word was measured by mean RT of Condition 
4 — mean RT of Condition 5.Negative value indicates negative priming, positive 
value indicates positive priming. 
Note. ***/;<.001, **/?<.01. 
Contrarily, consistent with hypothesis, reduced negative priming effect of sad 
words were found in the Comorbid Group (high depression, high anxiety) (see Figure 
4b). This was indicated by an insignificant difference between the mean RT in 
Condition 2 (neutral-sad) and Condition 1 (sad-sad) (Condition 2 - Condition 1 = -
7ms, p > .05). However, though not significant, a trend for positive priming effect of 
threat-related words was also seen in this group of participants as indicated by 
positive difference between Condition 4 (neutral-threat) and Condition 5 (threat-
threat) (Condition 4 - Condition 5 = 8ms, p > .10). Results reflected a tendency for 
the participants to selectively attend to both sad and threat-related word stimuli, as 
compared with neutral words. 







Sad Words Threat-related Words 
Figure 4b. Priming effect in the Comorbid Group (high depression and anxiety). 
Priming effect of sad word was measure by mean RT of Condition 2 — mean RT of 
Condition 1 ； and that of threat-related word was measured by mean RT of Condition 
4 - mean RT of Condition 5.Negative value indicates negative priming, positive 
value indicates positive priming. 
Similar reduced negative priming effect of sad words was found in the 
Depression Group (high depression, low anxiety). Difference between mean RT to 
the sad-prime-probe target condition (Condition 1) and that of the neutral-prime-sad-
probe target condition (Condition 2) was not significant (Condition 2 — Condition 1 = 
-6ms, > .10), indicating a tendency for the participants to selectively attend to sad 
stimuli. However, contrary to prediction, a positive priming effect of threat-related 
words was found. Participants responded significantly faster to a threat-related probe 
target when they were firstly presented with a threat prime, as compared with a 
neutral prime (Condition 4: neutral-threat - Condition 5: threat-threat = 11ms),尸(1, 
15) = 10.41,/? < .01, indicating a salient attentional bias towards threat-related 
stimuli (Figure 4c). 








Sad Words Threat-related Words 
Figure 4c. Priming effect in the Depression Group (high depression, low anxiety). 
Priming effect of sad word was measure by mean RT of Condition 2 - mean RT of 
Condition 1 ； and that of threat-related word was measured by mean RT of Condition 
4 - mean RT of Condition 5.Negative value indicates negative priming, positive 
value indicates positive priming. 
Note. **/)< .01. 
Finally, results obtained in the Anxiety Group (low depression, high anxiety) 
fitted well with prediction. Negative priming of sad words, as indicated by a 
significant negative value of mean RT of Condition 2 (neutral-sad) - Condition 1 
(sad-sad), and positive priming of threat-related words, as indicated by a significant 
positive value of mean RT of Condition 4 (neutral-sad) - Condition 5 (sad-sad), were 
found (Figure 4d). Participants responded significantly slower to the sad probe target 
when primed by a sad word, compared with a neutral word (Condition 2 - Condition 
1 = -8ms), F(l , 14) = 4.73, p < .05, but significantly faster to a threat-related probe 
target when firstly presented with a threat prime, as compared with a neutral prinie 
(Condition 4 - Condition 5 = 8ms), F(l , 14) = 7.88’p < .05, indicating a tendency 
for the participants to selectively attend to threat-related words, but no to sad-related 
words, as compared with neutral words. 









Sad Words Threat-related Words 
Figure 4d. Priming effect in the Anxiety Group (low depression, high anxiety). 
Priming effect of sad word was measure by mean RT of Condition 2 - mean RT of 
Condition 1 ； and that of threat-related word was measured by mean RT of Condition 
4 - mean RT of Condition 5.Negative value indicates negative priming, positive 
value indicates positive priming. 
Note. * / ; < .05. 
Emotional versus Neutral Target Stimuli 
The above analyses allowed also the comparison of RTs between emotional 
target stimulus conditions and neutral target conditions. Comparison of RTs between 
Condition 2 (neutral-sad)/Condition 4 (neutral/threat) and Condition 3 (neutral-
neutral) revealed that participants of the problem groups (Comorbid, Depression, and 
Anxiety Group) responded similarly to the target word stimuli regardless of whether 
they were sad/threat or neutral (RT of Condition 2/Coiidition 3/Condition 4 = 
627ms/620ms/616ms, 595ms/593ms/592ms, 586ms/584ms/582ms, respectively for 
Comorbid, Depression, and Anxiety Group; all p> .10). Participants in Normal 
Group, however, responded significantly faster to a neutral target than a sad target 
(Condition 3: neutral-neutral, RT = 592ms versus Condition 2: neutral-sad, RT = 
600ms), F(l,87) = 7.41’/) < .01, but no difference to a threat-related target 
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(Condition 3: neutral-neutral, RT = 592ms versus Condition 4: neutral-threat, RT = 
591ms;p> .10). 
Group Difference 
Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed to confirm any 
group difference separately for each experimental condition. Gender was again 
entered as covariate in the analysis. Consistent to results obtained from repeated 
measures analysis, no significant difference was found between the four groups of 
participants in each of the five experimental conditions (p > .10 for all conditions). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Discussion 
The present study aimed at testing the hypothesis of content-specific 
attentional bias in individuals with depression and anxiety. Based upon Beck's 
schema model and Bower's network model of information processing, we, as many 
other clinical researchers, suggested that people vulnerable to depressive and/or 
anxiety disorders would have a tendency to selectively attend to stimuli congruent to 
their emotional problems. In other word, depressed individuals would tend to attend 
to sad-related stimuli while individuals with anxiety would selectively attend to 
threat-related stimuli, whereas, people with comorbid problem of depression and 
anxiety would have a tendency to attend to both sad- and threat-related stimuli. 
A modified negative priming paradigm was used to examine these hypotheses. 
Participants' response times to a probe target after briefly primed with a single word 
of same or different emotional valence were measured and used for calculation of the 
negative priming effect. A significant main effect of experimental manipulation was 
found showing that different combinations of prime and probe target words produced 
significantly different conditions on the participants, thus leading to differences in 
mean RTs from the participants. Participants generally responded faster to threat-
related target words than neutral target words, which, in turn, faster than sad words. 
Consistent to our hypotheses, reduced negative priming effect of sad words was 
found in participants with comorbid depression/anxiety and in participants with 
depression only, but significant negative priming effect was found in the participants 
solely suffering from anxiety and those without depression and anxiety. These 
indicated an attentional bias towards sad-related stimuli specific to people suffering 
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from depression, regardless of comorbid or not. Contrast to prediction, however, 
positive priming effect of threat-related words was found in all four groups of 
participants, demonstrating a prevalent preference for attending to threat-related 
stimuli. 
Stimuli, Priming Effect, Attentional Bias, and Psychopathologies 
Priming effect (specifically, positive and reduced negative priming effect) 
was used to infer biased attentional processing in individuals with depression and/or 
anxiety in the present study. However, expected effects were found only for sad-
related stimuli but not threat-related stimuli. These findings, however, provided 
intriguing implications concerning the interaction between emotional valence of 
stimulus and attentional bias found in individuals with different psychopathologies. 
Attentional Bias towards Sad Stimuli in Depression 
Consistent with Joormann's (2004) findings on individuals with depression, 
participants scored highly in depression in the present study demonstrated reduced 
negative priming effect to sad stimuli. In contrary, significant negative priming effect 
was found in normal participants and participants with anxiety. According to 
Milliken et al.'s (1998) temporal discrimination hypothesis, in a probe trial, our 
orienting system and automatic retrieval system are simultaneously activated to 
compare the identities of the perceptual representation of the current probe target 
with the memorial representation of the prime stimulus. The purpose of this 
comparison is to decide where the probe target is the same or different from the 
prime. Identification as "same" implies that the probe target has already been learned 
before. It is a kind of "old", well-learned stimulus. Thus, retrieval of prior enquired 
knowledge is sufficient for introducing appropriate response. On the other hand, 
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identification as "different" implies the probe target as something "new", and 
therefore, engagement in detailed perceptional analysis is needed so as to acquire 
more information about the stimulus and to compromise the insufficient learned 
response available. Under such mechanisms, negative priming occurs when a prime 
is unattended but presented briefly before a probe target of related identity. In this 
situation, it is not sufficient to categorize the probe target as "same" (or "old") as the 
prime was unattended and memorial representation and thus, identity, of the prime is 
unclear. However, categorization of the probe target as "different" (or "new") is also 
impeded because, though unattended, the prime did have been processing to a certain 
degree and a very brief mental representation of the prime with related identity as 
that of the probe target is formed. Thus, an ambiguity is produced and slowed 
response is resulted. Nevertheless, this negative priming effect can be eliminated by 
simply attending to the prime stimulus. In this way, a quick "same" decision can be 
produced in the temporal discrimination process and a faster response is resulted 
(Milliken etal., 1998). 
In the present study, although all participants were presented with identical 
instructions and sad word stimuli, significant negative priming effect was observed 
solely in the normal and the anxiety participant group, but not in the comorbid and 
the depression group. The results suggested that participants in the former two 
groups were unlikely attending to the sad words in priming, but those in the 
comorbid and the depression group tended to selectively attend to the sad prime 
words, even though they were task-irrelevant, and as a result, negative priming effect 
was reduced in the later two groups. These findings supported the hypothesis that 
individuals with depression, regardless of comorbid with anxiety or not, are vigilant 
to stimuli congruent to their emotional vulnerability. Possessing maladaptive 
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cognitive schema of depression, these individuals are more sensitive to sad-related 
stimuli in their environment. Though not intentionally, they have a tendency to 
attend to emotion-congruent stimuli in their surroundings. 
Results of the present study provided supporting empirical evidence to the 
literatures of emotion-congruent attentional bias in individuals with e levated level of 
depression (e.g., Eizenman et a l , 2003; Gotlib et a l , 2004; Koster, De Raedt, 
Goeleven, Franck, & Crombez, 2005; Mogg, Bradley, & Williams, 1995; Nunn et al., 
1997). Gotlib and colleagues (2004), for example, showed that when presented with 
pictures of face with different emotional valences, individuals diagnosed with major 
depressive disorder tended to selectively attend to sad faces. But such an at tentional 
bias was found neither in their nonpsychiatric control group nor in participants 
diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder. Although we still debate the validity of 
the experimental paradigms used in some of the research in examining attentional 
bias, findings from these studies did provide convergent evidences to dys func t iona l 
information processing tendency in the group of individuals suffering from 
depressive problems. 
Absence of Specific Attentional Bias towards Threat-related Words in Anxiety 
Parallel expected results, however, could not be found in threat-related words 
in the present study. Significant positive priming effect was found in three participant 
groups: depression, anxiety, and normal control. Though insignificant, a similar 
positive priming effect was also found in the comorbid depression/anxiety group, 
indicating a tendency of all participants, including those with neither anxiety nor 
depression, to attend to the threat-related stimuli, as compared to neutral stimuli, in 
the priming experiment. Attention towards the threat prime word facilitated the 
matching between the threat probe target and the memorial representation of the 
,�.:.�...‘�.�Attentional Bi s in Depression and Anxiety 58 
prime as ‘‘same,，. As a result, a faster response to the probe target was generated and 
no negative priming effect was seen. 
Such findings are inconsistent to our prediction and to results obtained in past 
studies. As many other researchers, we suggested that heightened attention towards 
threat-related stimuli should be due to the present of a danger schema in the 
cognitive system, which should be specific to individuals with anxiety. Early 
experiences of risk and hazard lead to the development of such a maladaptive 
cognitive schema. Anxious individuals with danger schema become more sensitive to 
threat-related stimuli and selectively attend to these emotion-congruent stimuli. 
Numerous studies also demonstrated attentional bias in individuals with various 
forms of anxiety (e.g., Bradley, Mogg, & Millar, 2000; Liu, Qian, Zhou, & Wang, 
2006; Musa et al., 2003; Taghavi et a l , 2003; Taghavi et al., 1999; Vassilopoulos, 
2005). Vassilopoulos (2005), for example, found that individuals high in social 
anxiety (as compared to low socially anxious participants) tended to show selective 
attention towards both social and physical threat words presented for 200ms in a dot 
probe task. Contrarily, current results of attentional bias towards threat-related 
stimuli in all participant groups may suggest some intriguing properties of the stimuli 
themselves and their influence on individuals with or without emotional problems. 
Biased attention towards threat-related words, especially in the normal group, 
reflected that threat-related stimuli are of great survival relevance or evolutionary 
significance to human beings. This type of stimulus provides cues to danger and 
prepares the individual for the appropriate reactions, particularly, the "fight" or 
"flight" response to protect oneself from attack and being hurt. We may have been 
wired-up in our brain from birth to pay special attention to such kind of cues in our 
surroundings. Therefore, threat-related stimuli are propend to be attention drawing 
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and a quick reaction to threat-related stimuli is demanded even in people who are not 
vulnerable to anxiety problem (Yiend & Mathews, 2005). Results from analyses of 
main effect of experimental condition in the present study further supported this idea. 
Participants in general responded faster to threat-related probe targets. In contrast, it 
is suggested that sad stimuli are in nature comparatively distant from basic survival 
functioning. Indeed, sad-related stimuli may be related to strong distressing emotions 
and motivate avoidance in general. Therefore, participants generally responded 
slower in the sad probe target conditions. However, with highly activated 
depressogenic schemas, individuals with depression will be easily attracted by sad-
related stimuli and show attentional bias towards the stimuli, like those depressed 
participants in the present study. 
As shown in Koster, Verschuere, Crombex, and Van Damme,s (2005) study 
of attentional bias in individuals with different levels of trait anxiety, participants 
performed similarly in the high threat stimuli condition, regardless of their level of 
trait anxiety (high versus low), but they performed differently in mild threat stimuli 
condition, across different stimuli presentation durations. Perhaps, the threat-related 
words used in the present study may be too threatening or of high emotional valence 
and as a result, a ceiling effect was produced. Thus, we would suggest using threat-
related stimuli with milder emotional valence in future studies of attentional bias 
using negative priming paradigm. 
Methodology and Attentional Bias 
Experimental Paradigm 
Past research applied a variety of experimental paradigms to investigate 
selective attention in individuals with different emotional problems. However, as 
,�.:.�...‘�.�Attentional Bi s in Depression and Anxiety 60 
discussed in the literature review, the findings are inconsistent and not all studies 
using the different kinds of experimental paradigm obtained positive results to the 
content-specific attentional bias hypothesis. The present study provided the first 
empirical evidence to support the use of negative priming paradigm to examine 
emotion-congruent attentional bias in participants with depression and/or anxiety. 
Different versions of the paradigm have been applied in the clinical setting to 
investigate cognitive inhibition in obsessive-compulsive disorder (e.g., Enright et al., 
1995), impulsives and anxiety (e.g., Avila & Antonia Parcet, 1997)，and depression 
(e.g., MacQueen et al., 2000). But there rarely has any study tried examining 
attentional bias in depression and anxiety. The negative priming paradigm may 
provide a better way to examine selective attention in emotional psychopathologies, 
which is immune to the influence of attentional shift from external to internal stimuli 
in emotionally disturbed individuals- a phenomenon that may have affected the 
reliability and validity of other experimental paradigms. 
It is important to note that examination of attentional bias from priming effect 
is different from the simple interpretation of response latency to the corresponding 
emotional stimuli. Reported in the pervious chapter, most of the participants showed 
no difference in their response times to the emotional word stimuli as compared with 
the neutral stimuli (i.e. Condition 2: neutral-sad/Condition 4: neutral-threat versus 
Condition 3: neutral-neutral). These may lead to an interpretation of no attentional 
bias in all groups of participants for all type of emotional stimuli. However, we 
would suggest that it is not valid to use such simple response time data as an 
indicator of attentional bias. As stated by Cowan (2005), clarification of the kind of 
attentional mechanism to investigate is important to determine the appropriateness of 
the type of experimental procedure used. The simple motor response time would be a 
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helpful index of attentional bias if and only if we expect to see that the biased 
attention necessarily leads to an immediate motor response. While an individual may 
selectively direct his/her attention towards the emotion-congruent stimuli at the first 
sight, but immediately he/she may shift his/her attention away to avoid the 
unpleasant emotions aroused, or to attend to internal stimuli elicited by this external 
stimulus and the chain of thoughts that follow. As a result, it would not be surprising 
to see this participant responding no quicker in condition with emotion-congruent 
targets (i.e., Condition 2: neutral-sad or Condition 4: neutral-threat) than in neutral 
target condition (i.e., Condition 3: neutral-neutral). This is similar to the criticisms 
directed to the naturalistic visual scanning paradigm and the dot probe task discussed 
in chapter one. Indeed, we think that it is better to assess biased attention by 
examining how an on-going task is interrupted whenever a participant's attention is 
captured by emotional stimuli. Attentional bias in people with emotional problems is 
revealed by a "process" of attentional shift. 
Comorbidity and Group Comparison 
Another merit of the current study is the simultaneous comparison of 
attentional bias in four groups of participants with relatively clear cut of emotional 
problem. Comorbidity is a well-known challenge to the study of depression and 
anxiety in clinical research. At most of the time, participants in a particular group 
possess a secondary emotional problem in addition to the primary emotional problem 
used for grouping, especially in the case of clinical patients (e.g., Gotlib et al., 2004; 
Mathews et al., 1996; Mogg et al., 2000). In effect, interpretation of these findings 
becomes more complicated. By recruiting a comparatively large number of 
participants (204 participants in this study), we successfully obtained well 
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demarcated groups of problem participants with single or comorbid emotional 
problems. 
Moreover, in a majority of past research, studies were carried out only in two 
to three groups of participants. This is, in essence, insufficient for examining 
specificity of attentional bias towards particular kind stimulus in a particular group of 
individuals. In the present study, data obtained from the normal control group acted 
as a baseline for comparison and expectation for behaviors in participants with 
different psychopathologies. They acknowledged the survival relevance of threat-
related stimuli to even people without anxiety and provided explanation to the 
finding of non-exclusive attentional bias towards threat-related stimuli. Thus, in 
order to obtain a whole picture of specific information processing bias in individuals 
with various psychopathologies, simultaneous comparison of the various groups of 
individual with is very important. 
Limitations and Further Studies 
Attentional bias of subclinical participants with elevated level of depression 
and/or anxiety was examined in the present study. An advantage of testing selective 
attention in subclinical participants is that it allows us to generalize the results to the 
much greater population of subclinical individuals suffering from emotional problem. 
Nevertheless, however comparable the depression and anxiety level of the present 
participants to clinical patients, generalizability of results of the current study to the 
clinical population is questionable. Though there are some advocates to the 
conceptual similarity between clinical and subclinical conditions in general, and to 
the extrapolation of results from subclinical to clinical conditions (e.g., Flett, 
Vredenberg, & Krames, 1997; Vredenberg, Flett, & Krames, 1993), it has been a 
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continuous debate among clinical researchers (e.g., Coyne, 1994; Tennen, Hall, & 
Affleck, 1995). Therefore, it is recommended the experiment to be carried out also in 
clinical patients with diagnoses of major depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, and 
comorbid depressive/anxiety disorder. 
As a common problem in experimental study of psychopathology, the present 
study also suffers from the limitation of small sample size. There were less than 20 
participants in each of the three problem groups (Comorbid: 15，Depression: 16， 
Anxiety: 15). As a result, the power of the experiment, and the reliability and 
generalizability of the findings were unavoidably affected. However, one should note 
that in the present study, more than 200 participants had actually been recruited. But 
understandably, most individuals in the pool of participants had only mild level of 
depression and anxiety, and thus more than 30 percentages of the data had been 
discarded. Nevertheless, at the expense, we successfully obtained four groups of 
participants with clear-cut emotional problems comparable to clinical patients. 
Furthermore, as noted by Milliken et al. (1998), negative priming effect has 
not always been observed in past studies for ignored primes, and positive priming 
effect has not always been observed for previously attended prime stimuli (e.g., Dark 
& Schmidt, 1996; Sullivan, Faust, & Balota, 1995). Thus, it is still not safe enough to 
assume that the sign of priming effect found in a negative priming experiment as 
directly related to whether a prime was attended or ignored. Nevertheless, for there 
are some robust findings in past research supporting the correlation (e.g., Allport, 
Tipper, & Chmiel’ 1985; Sullivan & Faust, 1993; Tipper, 1985), results from a 
negative priming paradigm may be trustful. Also, in view of the findings of both 
negative and positive priming effect in the present study, and the fitness of the 
findings to our hypothesized information processing bias in the corresponding 
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participant groups, we are quite confident that the negative priming experiment used 
in the current study did provide results reflecting the attentional status (attended 
versus ignored) of the participants to the particular types of prime stimulus. 
Nonetheless, more studies are needed in the future to examine the reliability and 
validity of the negative priming paradigm in detecting selective attention. If more 
negative evidences emerge, the interpretation of our results in terms of proving the 
attentional bias in the depressed participants may be threatened. 
Finally, as discussed before, a ceiling effect was observed for the threat prime 
condition that all participants showed attentional bias towards the stimuli. It is 
suggested that this was due to the high emotional valence of the threat stimuli. With 
highly threat valence, everyone would be sensitized to the stimulus and thus attend to 
it, even those with no anxiety problem. In contrast, if it is replaced by milder 
stimulus, only anxious individuals with maladaptive danger schema would attend to 
the stimulus and consider it as seriously "threatening". In effect, attentional bias 
towards threat-related stimuli can be detected exclusively in the anxious participants. 
Thus, it is recommended that threat-related stimuli with milder level of emotionality 
to be used in future studies of attentional bias in anxiety. Nevertheless, one should 
also note that the failure of the present study in demonstrating attentional bias 
towards threat stimuli specifically in anxious participants might reflect a problem of 
sensitivity of the present experiment. Improvement may be done on the stimulus 
level or participant level in future studies. For example, words those are more closely 
related to the target participants may be used and rated by both normal people and 
people with the emotional problems. These would improve the relevance and 
appropriateness of the stimuli. Besides, study of extreme groups of participants with 
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more severe emotional problems may also improve the sensitivity of the experiment 
in the detection of content-specific attentional bias. 
Conclusion 
As Beck's model of schema (Beck, 1976; see also Beck & Clark, 1988; Beck 
et al., 1986) and Bower's (Bower, 1981; Bower & Cohen, 1982) Network Model 
suggest, attentional bias towards emotion-congruent stimuli is a potent characteristic 
of information processing in people with emotional problems. It contributes to the 
development and maintenance of psychopathologies. Thus, it is of great clinical 
importance to detect such information processing tendency and to develop 
corresponding treatment programme to break the vicious circle. The present study 
attempted to provide empirical support for content-specific attentional bias for 
depression, but not anxiety, by introducing a modified negative priming paradigm to 
investigate the phenomenon. 
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